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Abstract
We examine the problem faced by a company that wishes to purchase
patents in the hands of two di¤erent patent owners. Complementarity of these
patents in the production process of the company is a prime e¢ciency reason
for them being owned (or licenced) by the company. We show that this very
same complementarity can lead to patent owners behaving strategically in bar-
gaining, and delaying their sale to the company. When the company is highly
leveraged, such ine¢cient delay is limited. Comparative statics results are also
obtained.
1 Introduction
The human genome has been recently mapped. One of the main challenges now is to
understand the relationship between the di¤erent DNA sequences. At the same time,
¤Menezes greatfully acknowledges the …nancial support from CNPq and ARC.
1
several DNA sequences have already been patented – the U.S. Patent and Trademarks
O¢ce had issued more than 2,000 patents covering gene sequences by the end of 1999
– and it will likely be the case that in many circumstances new applications will
require multiple DNA sequences whose patents are held by di¤erent owners. Will
this patent assembly be accomplished e¢ciently or will it hinder innovation and the
discovery of new drugs or treatments?
The literature on asset ownership (Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995)), pre-
dicts that complementary assets should be owned by the same party. While seemingly
simple, the reason behind this result is quite subtle: Two assets are complementary
if the marginal product of asset-speci…c investments by any one party is zero if the
assets are not used together. Separate ownership of these assets weakens each party’s
outside value of the asset, and this increases the surplus that is extracted by the
opposing party. Anticipating such a problem, each party will invest less in the spe-
ci…c project than is desirable. In contrast, if the assets are owned together, then the
owner’s outside value of the combination is high. Such an owner has greater incentive
to invest ex-ante.
This result assumes that there is a competitive market in assets prior to parties
agreeing to do business with one-another. However, there are many cases in which
markets for assets can be quite thin. Two (or more) completely separate owners will
often make separate discoveries that would – purely through chance – generate higher
value if they were combined. Combining such discoveries takes on an importance of
its own when markets are thin: An interesting example of this was the development
of a virus-resistant papaya in Hawaii. To be able to produce and distribute trans-
genic seeds resistant to the papaya ring spot virus, it was necessary to obtain the
legal rights of other patents that would be infringed. Four relevant patents had to
be identi…ed and their owners contacted for negotiations. It turned out that “the
process of obtaining agreements from the patent holds was long and arduous. Each
patent holder had his own agenda for licensing, ranging from having little interest
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in protecting a patent to placing a very high priority on negotiating the most favor-
able deal.” 1 This problem of patent assembly has been recognized in many areas.
Lowe (2000), for example, suggests that “for inventions involving multiple patents
held by di¤erent parties, there are high transaction costs associated with bargaining
over rights, which can lead to blocking of commercial development ” in the health
care industry. His example is the recombinant hepatitis B vaccine, which requires
fourteen di¤erent patents to be produced.
We develop a model to capture the problem of combining separate patents (or
other assets such as land) when owners can delay sale for strategic advantage. Our
main result is that complementarity – while a major reason for assets to be owned
together – is also more likely to lead to costly delay in patent purchase. Grossman
and Hart (1980) analyze a similar problem; a raider will not takeover a corporation
because the returns from any corporate management improvements introduced by the
raider will be captured by existing shareholders. The reason for such ine¢ciency is
the public goods nature of managing a corporation. Grossman and Hart then examine
several devices that are meant to avoid this nonexcludibility problem. In contrast,
ine¢ciency in our setting arises from strategic behavior by patent owners.
The land assembly problem has also some common features with the chasing
patents game we analyze; a developer wants to assembly several parcels of land to
undertake a project that delivers positive externalities to surrounding land owners.
When the developer cannot make a credible all-or-nothing o¤er, ine¢ciency is likely
to occur: Existing owners will wait in order to capture the rents resulting from the
completion of the project. 2 In our model the source of ine¢ciency is the bargaining
1As cited in “Virus-Resistant Papaya in Hawaii: A Sucess Story,” ISB News Report, Jan-
uary 1999, available at www.plant.uoguelph.ca/safefood/archives/agnet/ 1999/1-1999/ag-01-09-99-
01.txt.
2Grossman and Hart argue that these externalities could be avoided if the developer could hide
his intentions from the lot owners. There is however a large literature on land assembly. Recent
papers eliminate the externality problem either by assuming that lot owners can make …nal o¤ers
above their reservation prices, as in Eckart (1985), or by taking a cooperative approach, as in Asami
(1988). O’Flaherty (1994) studies urban renewal – when a public authority has the power to buy
the lots and resell them to the developer – and shows that it is not a good remedy for the externality
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process, not the existence of positive externalities from project completion.
While the standard literature on patents3 focuses on the link between R&D and
patents, we abstract from the development stage. Our goal is to study the mechanisms
by which multiple patents are acquired and investigate its implications for e¢ciency.
In our model there are two patent owners, and a third party who wishes to combine
them. Each patent owner can choose to negotiate sale of the patent to the third party
immediately or delay negotiation in the hope of a better deal. The model is described
in detail below.
2 The Model
There are three players in the model. A pharmaceutical company (player 0) wants to
buy two patents, and realize a value v from owning the entire set. However, each of
these two patents are owned by players – two patent owners – 1 and 2 respectively,
who value the patents at wi; i = 1; 2. The pharmaceutical company values the
individual patent of i at vi; i = 1; 2. We assume that the value of the two patents
together exceeds the sum of the individual valuations, i.e.
v > v1 + v2;
and that the pharmaceutical company values the individual patents at least as much
as the owners, i.e.
vi ¸ wi:
Ideally, the pharmaceutical company would like to engage each of the patent
owners together, make a take-or-leave-it o¤er wi; i = 1; 2, and realize the value v ¡
w1 ¡w2. This may not be possible. A patent owner may perceive an advantage from
problem.
3Arrow (1962) is a classical reference on analyzing inventions that reduce production costs.
Kamien (1992) surveys the extensive theoretical literature on patent licensing. Mazzoleni and Nelson
(1998) provide a more recente review of the theoretical literature on patents.
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not going to the bargaining table when the other owner is present. In other words, it
might be advantageous for the company to delay sale of the patent, perhaps hoping
for a higher price later on.
To model this possibility, we assume there are two possible times at which each
party can go to the bargaining table, ti = n (“now”) and ti = l (“later”), i = 1; 2. We
assume that the patent owners i = 1; 2 simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose
pi the probability of going to the bargaining table now, with probability (1¡ pi)
of going later. This choice leads to four possible events: Both parties are at the
bargaining table now, probability p1p2; party 1 is at the table now, and party 2 later
and vice-versa, probabilities p1 (1¡ p2) and p2 (1¡ p1), and; both parties are at the
bargaining table later, probability (1¡ p1) (1¡ p2).
We assume that once players are at the table, they bargain e¢ciently over the
exchange of patents. This allows us to examine the pure question of how strategic
avoidance of bargaining a¤ects welfare, without biasing results by assuming ine¢cient
bargains. To this end, we adopt a generalized form of Nash bargaining to determine
the payo¤s to each player in each event. We assume that the payo¤ to an individual
in a bargain is generically as follows:
payo¤ = (threatpoint payo¤) + (bargaining share) ¢ [available surplus - sum(threatpoint payo¤s)].
(1)
Our interpretation throughout of the threatpoint payo¤ of a bargainer is standard:
it is the payo¤ if bargaining breaks down completely, with no possibility of reconcil-
iation. Thus, the overall payo¤ is the sum of the threatpoint payo¤, and a share of
the gains from trade.
We assume that the pharmaceutical company is unable to commit to leave the
bargaining table at time n. To do so would not be subgame perfect: Speci…cally,
suppose that the company purchased a patent from one owner at date n. This
agreement yields a positive payo¤, and becomes sunk. The time l agreement also
yields a positive payo¤, and the pharmaceutical company has an incentive to stay at
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the table. Therefore, we only need to focus on the payo¤s of the two patent owners,
since only these players are able to make strategic choices in the model.
Let the notation s (tj; tk) denote the payo¤ to either player j 2 f1; 2g or k 6=
j 2 f1; 2g, when the outcome of their choices of pj and pk are tj 2 fn; lg and
tk 2 fn; lg respectively. If all three players are at the bargaining table at time n, so
that t1 = t2 = n, then i = 1; 2 receive
s (n; n) = wi + ®i ¢ (v ¡ w1 ¡ w2)
in present value dollars, where ®j ¸ 0, §2j=0®j = 1, is the bargaining share of the
gains from trade v ¡ w1 ¡ w2 of player j = 0; 1; 2, in a three player bargain. For
i = 1; 2, value wi is i0s bargaining ‘threatpoint’, being the value placed on the next
best use of the patent. We assume that date l payo¤s are discounted by the factor
± 2 (0; 1), so that the payo¤ to player i = 1; 2 in present value terms from the three
player bargain is
s (l; l) = ± ¢ (wi + ®i ¢ (v ¡ w1 ¡ w2)).
We can interpret a higher ± as a longer period of delay between dates n and l, or
directly as a stronger time preference for all players.
Determination of the payo¤s for situations where there is only one patent holder
at the table at any given time, requires some careful thought. Suppose patent holder
j is at the table at date l. At this time, patent holder k 6= j has made a bargain
with the pharmaceutical company. Therefore the total available surplus at date l is
v. However, the company can threaten not to purchase j’s patent, and just use the
…rst owner’s patent, i.e. the company’s threatpoint payo¤ is v1. Applying the Nash
bargaining formula (1) above, yields a present value payo¤ to player j of
s (l; n) = ± ¢ ¡wj + ¯j ¢ (v ¡ vk ¡ wj)¢ ,
where ¯j 2 (0; 1) is the bargaining share of player j vis-a-vis the company. Note that
the company is potentially advantaged because it can extract a threatpoint payo¤ of
vk > 0 in this bargain, due to the fact that it now holds patent k.
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Now suppose j is at the bargaining table at date n, and k bargains at date l.
Consider the agreement between owner j and the company at date n. The company’s
threat – should bargaining break down – is not to deal with player j, wait until date
l, and receive payo¤ (1¡ ¯k) ¢ (vk ¡ wk), being its share 1 ¡ ¯k of the gains from
trade vk ¡ wk in the bargain with the other player k. Owner k’s threatpoint payo¤
is wk. We assume that both bargainers anticipate that e¢cient bargaining will yield
the total value v.4 This yields a payo¤ at date n to player l of
s (n; l) = wj + ¯j ¢ [v ¡ wj ¡ ± ¢ (1¡ ¯k) ¢ (vk ¡ wk)].
The important point to note is that the pharmaceutical company’s future payo¤ from
dealing with player k alone, a¤ects the surplus in the bargain at date n with player
j. Thus, the payo¤s capture –in a rigorous way– intertemporal competition between
the two patent-holders.
Now consider patent owner j0s choice of pj at the beginning of the game. The
owner’s expected payo¤ is calculated by weighting the payo¤s derived above with the
probabilities of each event:
¼j = pj ¢ pk ¢ [wj + ®j ¢ (v ¡wj ¡wk)] (2)
+ pj ¢ (1¡ pk) ¢ [wj + ¯j ¢ (v ¡ wj ¡ ± ¢ (1¡ ¯k) ¢ (vk ¡ wk))]
+ (1¡ pj) ¢ pk ¢
£
± ¢ ¡wj + ¯j ¢ (v ¡ vk ¡wj)¢¤
+ (1¡ pj) ¢ (1¡ pk) ¢ [± ¢ (wj + ®j ¢ (v ¡ wj ¡ wk))]
3 Solution and Results
We can derive Nash equilibria in the model by examining the derivative of (2). After
some simpli…cation, the derivative becomes:
d¼j
dpj
= pk ¢X + (1¡ pk) ¢ Y (3)
4That is, both players know that bargaining is e¢cient, and that bargaining at date 2 will lead
to an agreement that gives gross payo¤ v.
7
where
X = s (n; n)¡ s (l; n) (4)
= (1¡ ±) ¢ wj +
¡
®j ¡ ±¯j
¢ ¢ (v ¡ wj ¡ wk) + ± ¢ ¯j ¢ (vk ¡ wk) ,
and
Y = s (n; l)¡ s (l; l) (5)
= (1¡ ±) ¢ wj +
¡
¯j ¡ ± ¢ ®j
¢ ¢ (v ¡ wj ¡ wk) + ¯j(wk ¡ ± ¢ (2¡ ¯k) ¢ (vk ¡wk))
Proposition 1 There is ine¢cient delay in equilibrium if X < 0 and Y > 0 in the
form of multiple equilibria (p1; p2) 2 f(1; 0) ; (0; 1) ; (p1; p2)g with
pk =
(1¡ ±) ¢ wj +
¡
¯j ¡ ±®j
¢ ¢ (v ¡ wj ¡ wk) + ¯j ¢ (wk ¡ ± ¢ (1¡ ¯k) ¢ (vk ¡ wk))
(1 + ±) ¢ ¡¯j ¡ ®j¢ ¢ (v ¡wj ¡wk) + ¯j ¢ (wk ¡ ± (2¡ ¯k) ¢ (vk ¡ wk))
(6)
j 6= k = 1; 2.
Proof. From equation (3), we have d¼j
dpj
= 0 where pk = pk =
Y
Y ¡X 2 (0; 1) as
X < 0, Y > 0. On substitution, pk is given by equation (6). The best response
correspondences of the owners are given by
pj =
8<: 0 for pk > pk[0; 1] for pk = pk
1 for pk < pk
j 6= k = 1; 2.
This is because if pk > pk,
d¼j
dpj
= pk ¢ X + (1¡ pk) ¢ Y < 0, as X < 0; Y > 0.
Similarly, if pk < pk,
d¼j
dpj
> 0 as X < 0; Y > 0. To calculate equilibria, suppose …rst
that p2 = 0 < p2. Owner 1’s best response is p1 = 1. Owner 2’s best response to
p1 = 1 > p1 is p2 = 0. Thus, (1; 0) a Nash equilibrium, as is (0; 1) by a symmetrical
argument. Consider the point (p1; p2). Neither owner increases their payo¤ from
deviating, so that this point is also a Nash Equilibrium. There are no other Nash
equilibria, since owner 2 will deviate from any point (p1; p2) if p1 6= p1.
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First note that delay is always ine¢cient, because the total available surplus
v ¡ w1 ¡ w2 is discounted. The intuition for proposition 1 is made easier by noting
that owners 1 and 2 are playing an intertemporal coordination game. The term
X is the di¤erence between owner j’s payo¤ from bargaining now and bargaining
later, conditional on owner k bargaining now (i.e. X = s (n;n) ¡ s (l; n)). Since
X < 0, owner j prefers to be absent now when owner k is present. The term Y is
the di¤erence between j’s payo¤ from bargaining now and bargaining at time l when
owner k bargains at time l (i.e., Y = s (n; l)¡s (l; l)). Owner j prefers to bargain now
in this case. In summary, both owners would prefer to be absent from the bargain if
the other player is present; they wish to coordinate to be apart.
The proposition as it stands does not give us su¢cient insight into the basic
motivation for equilibrium delay; we need to examine the structure of payo¤s more
carefully:
Proposition 2 Suppose that discounted bilateral bargaining yields a larger share of
surplus than trilateral bargaining (i.e. ±¯i > ®i, i = 1; 2). Then there is ine¢cient
delay in the equilibrium outcome if patents are (su¢ciently) complementary, i.e. if
either
(i) vi = wi, and ± is su¢ciently near unity (precisely, ± >
wi+®i(v¡wi¡wk)
wi+¯i(v¡wi¡wk) ; i 6= k =
1; 2); or
(ii) v is su¢ciently large.
Proof. For case (i), we have X negative for ± > wi+®i(v¡wi¡wk)
wi+¯i(v¡wi¡wk) and Y positive if
±¯j ¡ ®j > 0. For (ii), ®j ¡ ±¯j < 0 implies from equation (4) that X is monotonic
decreasing in v, so that X < 0 for v su¢ciently large. Since ¯j ¡ ±®j > 0, we see
from equation (5) that Y is monotonic increasing in v, so Y > 0 for su¢ciently large
v. From Proposition (1), there is delay in all the equilibria for cases (i) and (ii).
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. For part (i), the pharmaceutical
company’s value of a single patent is no greater than the value to the owner (vi = wi).
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Thus, the pharmaceutical company does not gain much of an advantage if it purchases
a patent. This is true when the company is bargaining with only one owner at either
date n or at date l. In the former case – a deal with one owner at date n – the company
anticipates that it does not have much intertemporal bargaining power from a future
deal. In the latter case – an agreement with one owner at date l – the company
holds a patent that doesn’t give it much immediate bargaining power. The lack of a
strong threatpoint on the part of the company when there is only one owner at the
table, means that the owner is negotiating over a larger net surplus. In addition, the
anticipated share of this net surplus to an owner (when the other is absent) is larger,
even when the owner must delay its going to the bargaining table (i.e. we assumed
±¯j > ®j). Consequently, both parties would prefer to be at the table alone. From
proposition 1, there is delay in all three equilibria. With part (ii), there is ine¢cient
delay for analogous reasons. The total available surplus v is high, therefore the gains
to owners from being alone is also high.
In both cases (i) and (ii), the driving force behind delay is the degree of comple-
mentarity and the fact that bilateral bargaining power exceeds trilateral bargaining
power. Since v > v1+v2, and ±¯j > ®j, each patent owner has an increased incentive
to not coordinate with the other owner. In this way, the parties can “divide and
conquer”: By negotiating separately – at least with some probability – there is a
sunk component to the date n agreement. The owners seize a larger share ±¯j > ®j
of a large gain from trade. For example, if party 1 bargained at date n, and received
share ¯1, then party 2 bargains at date n and receives share ±¯2. Each owner extracts
more of an expected pie than if they negotiate at the same date with shares ®1 and
®2.
4 Comparative Statics
In this section we examine the changes in equilibrium behavior resulting from changes
in some of the structural parameters. Denote d¼j
dpj
= f (pk; ±; v; vk; vj ; wj ; wk). Note
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that this schedule is decreasing in pk under the assumptions in proposition 1, since
fpk = X ¡ Y < 0. Thus, the change in the equilibrium value of ¹pk with a change in
the parameter µ 2 f±; v; vk; vj; wj; wkg depends on the how f changes with respect to
µ. This is depicted in …gure 1 with some abuse of notation where for convenience we
write f (pk; µ).
Figure 1 here
Note that if a rise in parameter µ leads to a rise in f , then ¹pk rises to ¹p0k, and if it
leads to a fall in f , then ¹pk falls to ¹p00k. Thus, we only need determine the sign of fµ
to determine the comparative statics e¤ects.
As a check on intuition, consider the e¤ect of an increase in ±. We would expect
that this leads to an increase in delay. Di¤erentiating f yields
f± = ¡2wj ¡
¡
®j + ¯j
¢
(v ¡ wj ¡ wk)¡ ¯j (1¡ ¯k) (vk ¡ wk) < 0
as expected: When ± rises, then not only does the gain from future payo¤s rise, but
the pharmaceutical company’s threatpoint payo¤ from not to dealing with j at time
n is improved (i.e. s (n; 2) falls).
With an increase in v, the situation is more complicated. We get
fv = pk (1 + ±)
¡
®j ¡ ¯j
¢
+ ¯j ¡ ±®j (7)
which is of ambiguous sign under the assumption that discounted bilateral bargaining
power exceeds trilateral bargaining power (±¯j > ®j). Figure 2 depicts how ¹pk changes
with v:
Figure 2 here
When ¹pk = 0, fv = ¯j ¡ ±®j > 0, and when ¹pk = 1, then fv = ®j ¡ ±¯j < 0. Also, fv
is decreasing in pk. It follows that fv is increasing below the value p^k where fv = 0,
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and is decreasing above p^k. Therefore, ¹pk is increasing for ¹pk < p^k and decreasing for
¹pk > p^k. Using the de…nition of p^k allows us to derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that discounted bilateral bargaining yields a larger share of
surplus than trilateral bargaining (i.e. ±¯i > ®i, i = 1; 2). Then INSERT CONDI-
TIONS
¯j ¡ ±®j
(1 + ±)
¡
®j ¡ ¯j
¢ > (<)(1¡ ±) ¢ wj + ¡¯j ¡ ±®j¢ ¢ (v ¡ wj ¡ wk) + ¯j ¢ (wk ¡ ± ¢ (1¡ ¯k) ¢ (vk ¡ wk
(1 + ±) ¢ ¡¯j ¡ ®j¢ ¢ (v ¡wj ¡wk) + ¯j ¢ (wk ¡ ± (2¡ ¯k) ¢ (vk ¡ wk))
5 Discussion and Extensions
Our aim in this paper is to provide a simple bargaining framework to analyze the
problem faced by a company who wants to buy complementary patents from distinct
patent owners. Accordingly several extensions are possible and some are discussed
below.
5.1 Wealth Constraints and E¢ciency
In the analysis above, it was impossible for the company to – commit at date n – not
to negotiate at date l. Being able to commit not to bargain is an extreme version of
a commitment to be a tough negotiator. The presence of wealth constraints on the
company admits the possibility that it can credibly commit to be a tougher negotiator
at date n. We explore this possibility here.
Suppose that the pharmaceutical company has at most wealthW 2 [w1+w2; v] to
expend on the purchase of the patents. This is possible, for example, if the company
is su¢ciently highly leveraged. Limited wealth means that the company can o¤er
at most W for the two patents in any agreements with the owners. For illustrative
purposes, suppose that wealth is the minimum, at W = w1 + w2. Consider the
bargaining outcome in each event. When both owners negotiate at date n, they can
receive no more than w1 + w2 between them. Since we assume that bargaining is
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e¢cient (to focus exclusively on the strategic incentives to delay), the payo¤ for each
party is s(n; n) = wi i = 1; 2.
Now suppose that only owner 1 is present at date n. The company’s threatpoint
payo¤ is the amount it will receive from a date l deal with party 2. In this cir-
cumstance, 2 receives ± ¢min fw1 + w2; w2 + ¯2 (v2 ¡ w2)g. Therefore, in the date n
agreement with the company, party 1 receives
s (n; l) = min [w1 + w2; w1 + ¯1 (v ¡ w1 ¡ ± ¢min fw1 + w2; w2 + ¯2 (v2 ¡ w2)g)] .
Consider the case where party 1 bargains at date l – after player 2 reaches agreement
at date n. The wealth remaining to the company for bargaining purposes is w1+w2¡
s (l; n)  w1 (where s (l; n) is de…ned symmetrically to s (n; l) – with subscripts 1 and
2 switched). It follows that the payo¤ to 1 is 0. Finally, if both parties bargain at
date n, they receive s (n; n) = wi. This gives the following expected pro…t to player
1:
¼1 = p1 ¢ p2 ¢w1
+ p1 ¢ (1¡ p2) ¢ s (n; l)
+ (1¡ p1) ¢ (1¡ p2) ¢ w1.
Di¤erentiating gives
d¼1
dp1
= p2w1 + (1¡ p2) (s (n; l)¡ w1) > 0.
Therefore, there is no ine¢cient delay in equilibrium. The wealth constraint serves
to commit the company to be a hard bargainer.
Clearly from the reasoning in the …rst part of the paper, if W = v, there is
ine¢cient delay. By the continuity of payo¤s, there must be some level of wealth
such that ine¢cient delay is eliminated. The presence of a wealth constraint on
the company can act as a credible commitment to tough bargaining at date n, and
13
therefore can eliminate the ine¢ciencies caused by strategic bargaining behavior by
owners. This holds true regardless of the degree of complementarity between patents
in the company’s production process.
5.2 Deterrence
The analysis tells us that in the absence of tight wealth constraints, there will be
ine¢cient delay. This suggests an intriguing possibility. Suppose the pharmaceutical
company faces a …xed cost of entering bargaining. The delay problem, and the fact
that the parties divide and conquer, could be su¢ciently severe that it is not worth-
while for the company to pursue the purchase of patents. This will happen whenever
the company’s expected payo¤ falls below the cost of entering into the bargaining
process.
5.3 Information Gathering and Renegotiation
Suppose now that each player can …nd out whether the other player is present at
the bargaining table at any given time. With this knowledge, a player can decide
whether it wishes to commence bargaining or wait until later to do so. In particular,
note that this is only relevant at end of date n: Either player can avoid making
a period n agreement, after observing whether the other is present, and wait until
period l.
First consider the equilibrium (p1; p2) = (1; 0) in the previous model. (In this
equilibrium owner 1 chooses to go to the bargaining table at date n when owner
2 chooses to go to the table at date l and vice versa.) Will this continue to be
an equilibrium when information gathering is possible? Consider player 1’s decision
when he arrives at the bargaining table, and …nds that player 2 has made the decision
not to show up. Will player 1 decide to walk away from bargaining and wait until
period l? This will clearly not occur, for the same reason that (1,0) is an equilibrium
in the previous model. By a symmetric argument (0,1) will also continue to be an
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equilibrium. Now consider the mixed strategy (¹p1; ¹p2). It is trivial to show that there
is no incentive to deviate from this strategy. Suppose that both players arrive at
the bargaining table at date n. They choose the same probability of exiting, and
bargaining at date l, for precisely the same reason (¹p1; ¹p2) was an equilibrium of the
previous game.
A standard device to eliminate ine¢ciencies in bargaining is to introduce costless
renegotiation. In this model, there is no incentive for parties to renegotiate. Once the
company has purchased a patent, the prior owner is no longer strategically relevant.
6 Conclusion
We examine the problem faced by a company that wants to purchase two complemen-
tary patents from distinct owners. Our model captures the process by which these
complementary patents are acquired and shows that ine¢cient delay can occur as a
result of patent owners being strategic. While the ownership literature asserts that
complementary patents should be owned together, we show that it is precisely this
situation that leads to ine¢cient delay. Indeed an increase in the degree of comple-
mentarity (via an increase in v) will ultimately lead to a higher the probability of
delay. However when the probability of delay is low, an increase in complementarity
leads to a reduction in the chance of delay.
As well as changing the degree of complementarity, we found su¢cient conditions
for delay to increase when the discount factor rises. Extensions include the intro-
duction of wealth constraints, information gathering and renegotiation. In all cases
ine¢cient delay is still a problem. However, with wealth constraints, delay can be
eliminated when the company has su¢ciently low wealth.
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